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The question of altruism versus national self-interest in international relations has been the focus of 
the First Great Debate in the theory of the discipline (the realist-idealist debate). In the post-cold-
war era, altruistic (from the point of view of nations-states) arguments have been a central element 
of power politics, as military operations that might also serve national interest need a justification 
that refers to the needs of humanity (=security and wellbeing of all individuals regardless of 
borders). There is an altruistic discourse strand on the protection of civilians on a global level that 
plays a central role in the creation of a framing within which violent action to protect civilians finds 
justification in current world affairs. On the theoretical, scholarly plane of the discursive strand, we 
find texts by cosmopolitan scholars1 and theorists on new wars,2 who emphasise the wellbeing and 
security of individuals regardless of borders. Many of these scholars call for humanitarian 
intervention and the enforcement of humanitarian order in conflicts wherein opportunist conflict 
                                                          
1 Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision (Oxford: Wiley, 2006); Daniel Bray, “Pragmatic 
Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State,” Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2009): 683–719; Chris Brown, “Cosmopolitanism, 
World Citizenship and Global Civil Society,” Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2000): 7–26; Jonathan Gilmore, “Protecting the Other: Considering the Process 
and Practice of Cosmopolitanism,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3 
(September 1, 2014): 694–719; Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, 
Transl. Max Pensky (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan 
Global Politics (London & New York, NY: Routledge, 2005); Andrew Linklater, The Problem of 
Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
2 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (New York: Zed Press, 2001); Paul Gilbert, 
New Terror, New Wars. (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2003); Mary Kaldor, New and Old 
Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Siniša 
Malešević, “The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary 
Violent Conflicts,” International Political Sociology 2, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 97–112; Patrick A. 
Mello, “Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War,” 
European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 297–309. 
entrepreneurs, terrorists or autocrats use chaos to achieve selfish gains by using violence against 
unarmed civilians.3 
On another plane, we have political texts by leaders in the US, the UK and France that oppose those 
conflict entrepreneurs who explicitly target civilians with their aggression using authoritarian 
violence, weapons of mass destruction or terror and crime:4 according to President Obama “We are 
determined to protect citizens of all nations while also upholding fundamental rights, using every 
legitimate tool available to combat terrorism that is consistent with our laws and principles.”5 
In the political reality, international protection efforts have been strikingly ineffective, even 
counter-productive. After the first humanitarian intervention in 1999 in Serbia/Kosovo, similar 
interventions have taken place in eleven other cases; in seven of these under US leadership or 
                                                          
3 Alex J. Bellamy, “Syria Is a Failure of Commitment, Not Principle - The Washington Post,” The 
Washington Post, February 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2016/02/16/syria-is-a-failure-of-commitment-not-principle/; Allen Buchanan and Robert 
O. Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime,” Ethics & International Affairs 29, no. 01 
(March 2015): 15–37; Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; Mary Kaldor, New and Old 
Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era., 3rd edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2012); Mello, “Review Article”; Herfried Münkler, The New Wars. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002); Ramesh Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15,” International Affairs 92, no. 2 
(March 2016): 415–34. 
4 Tony Blair, “Prime Minister Outlines Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People. Comments Made Fol- 
Lowing a Joint UK, US and Spain Summit, The Azores, 16 March.,” March 16, 2003; George W. 
Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,”” (Office of the White House 
Press Secretary, remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy, November 6, 2003), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html; David Cameron, “PM’s Speech 
at London Conference on Libya. Given at Lancaster House, London, 29 March. Available at: 
Https://Www.Gov.Uk/Government/Speeches/Pms-Speech-at-London-Conference-on-Libya 
(Accessed 13 March 2017).,” March 29, 2011; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in 
Address to the Nation on Libya. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 28 March. 
Available at: Http://Www.Whitehouse.Gov/the-Press- Office/2011/03/28/Remarks-President-
Address-Nation-Libya (Accessed 14 June 2011).,” 2011; Nicholas Sarkozy, “Statement by the 
President of the Republic at the Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People. 19 March. 
Available at: Http://Fr.Ambafrance-Us.Org/Spip.Php?Article2241 (Accessed 14 June 2011).,” 
2011. 
5 Barack Obama, “Statement on the European Union-United States Agreement on the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program July 8, 2010,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
2010, Book 2. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2011), 1044. 
crucial involvement.6 In these interventions in countries that are unwilling or unable to protect their 
citizens from violence, intervention against tyrants, criminal conflict entrepreneurs or terrorists has 
explicitly been justified by references to the need to protect innocent civilians, even though this 
altruistic rationale has not necessarily been the (only) motive for intervention. Some of these 
interventions have formally been seen as humanitarian interventions or operations born of the 
responsibility to protect, and some have not. In all but one case, that of Sierra Leone, either the state 
has weakened or collapsed, or the number of fatalities has radically increased after the “protective” 
involvement has ensued, or both. Furthermore, conflicts tend to last longer once outside 
intervention occurs.7  
One of the reasons for this is that despite rhetoric justifying intervention for the purpose of 
protection of civilians, many of the domestic justifications for “protective” military action are in 
reality related to selfish national interest rather than altruistic cosmopolitanism. As Falk suggests 
humanitarian moves by states are often underfunded while interventions backed by sufficient 
                                                          
6 Military operations are considered protective if they are a) carried out in fragile countries (the list 
of fragile states is derived from Marshall & Cole, 2014, by removing elements that would lead to 
tautological arguments when the relationship between fragility and conflict is studied, see Timo 
Kivimäki, Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in 
Conflict. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming)., b) they are actual war (rather 
than peace-keeping) operations that are listed in the Uppsala conflict data Marie Allansson, Erik 
Melander, and Lotta Themner, “Organized Violence, 1989-2016.,” Journal of Peace Research 54, 
no. 4 (2017): 536–550. as internationalized intra-state conflicts or they are listed as civil conflicts, 
but they are interfered by sustained (at least three) aerial operations of outside powers (these the 
Uppsala data does not code as war participation). The cases are presented in Kivimäki, Failure to 
Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict., chap. 2., and 
they include Kosovo 1999, Sierra Leone 2000, Afghanistan 2001-, Iraq 2003-2011, 2014-, Pakistan 
2004-, Central African Republic 2006, Somalia 2007-, Yemen 2010-, Mali 2000, Libya 2011, 
Mauretania 2012-13 and Syria 2014-. The US was not centrally involved in the British operation in 
Sierra Leone (2000) or the French operations in the Central African Republic 2006, Mali 2000, and 
Mauretania 2012-13.  
7 Kivimäki, Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in 
Conflict., Chapter 4. 
resources tend to be strategic in motivation, and humanitarian only in rationalization.8 Thus, 
altruistic cosmopolitan justifications often help legitimize nationally self-interested operations, and 
this leads into greater suffering. This is the development that this article focuses on: How does, 
what Falk describes, happen empirically? Thus, this article investigates how selfish justifications 
enter cosmopolitan rationales in the political plane of the discourse. It makes sense of the ways in 
which selfish ideas can meddle in and merge with morally-based cosmopolitan norms.  
Existing literature 
Classical realist theories have emphasized the primacy of national interest in international relations 
as something of a natural reality: “Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define 
its own interests and to pursue power.”9 Due to the centrality of states in the organization of the 
world, moralism in which states try to intervene in the way other states rule their citizens is 
dangerous to the stability of world order.10 Furthermore, realist thinking often sees national self-
interest as a natural state of world affairs: self-interested behaviour is not only prescribed to states, 
it is also expected of them.11 From the realist perspective, then, the study of how nationalist 
selfishness enters the calculation of foreign relations is not an interesting one: self-interest is in the 
calculations as a default/natural state of affairs.  
Even the more structural, neorealist perspectives of international relations theory reject moralism 
that crosses borders and prescribes protection of citizens of other nations. Neorealists also share the 
assumption that the international system does not yet have effective rules that could regulate 
                                                          
8 Richard Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving 
Kosovars,’” in In Ken Booth, Ed., The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimension., 2nd edition 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 325–34. 
9 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Stanford University, 2017), 2, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-
relations/. 
10 Henry Kissinger, World Order (London: Penguin, 2014). 
11 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace., 7th ed., vol. 
Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson & W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006). 
interference of nations into each other’s internal affairs.12 Instead, anarchy is still seen by all realists 
as the basic characteristic of relations between states. 
Constructivist critics of realist thinking tend to emphasize the openness of social futures and the 
participation of shared epistemic approaches in the creation of our world political realities. Even if 
states behave selfishly, this does not mean that selfish behaviour is the only option available to 
them.13 If that were the case, morality and norms would be impossible to incorporate into the 
conceptualization of world politics. Yet, it is clear that norms affect the international society and 
that they must be included in our investigation, as suggested by the English school in critique of 
American realism.14 The very fact that most major military operations have been made politically 
possible by means of cosmopolitan justifications speaks to this reality.  
In addition to emphasizing the possibility of cosmopolitan agendas, cosmopolitan scholars often 
point out, in their critique of realism, that world politics is, indeed, observably moving in a more 
cosmopolitan direction.15 On the one hand cosmopolitan moralism is progressing:  
1. Individual rights of “global citizens” are being focused on more than the rights of states. 
2. All human beings, universally, are seen to possess the same moral status (rather than this 
status being affected by state borders). 
                                                          
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979). 
13 Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
14 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). 
15 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2003); 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jürgen Habermas, “Bestialität Und Humanität,” in Reinhard 
Merkel Ed., Der Kosovo Krieg Un Das Völkerecht. (Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 51–65; 
Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15.” 
3. Persons are subject of concern for everyone generally (rather than my obligations were 
limited to the borders of my state).16  
Individualism (with regards to rights), universalism and generality can be considered as the moral 
premises of cosmopolitan thinking, and it can be claimed that these premises have gained 
prominence in world politics. Concept of human security has emerged in complementation of the 
concept of state security,17 the international agenda of securing states has been directed to 
complemented by activities to protect civilians wherever they reside,18 and there are already 
international institutions that focus on global norms that oblige and safeguard people irrespective of 
their nationality.19  
This cosmopolitanization of security is part of a logical historical process as the long-term 
development is towards an expansion of zones of order. While primitive societies defended 
themselves in families against other families and then in clans and tribes against other clans and 
tribes, more developed societies organized their security and order in city-states and eventually in 
nation-states.20 There is, therefore, no reason to regard state-centred selfishness in world politics as 
                                                          
16 Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics, 3; see also Gillian Brick, Global Justice. A Cosmopolitan 
Account. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. A 
Global Political Theory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Allen Buchanan, Justice, 
Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for International Law. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Lee Jones, “Sovereignty, Intervention, and Social Order in Revolutionary 
Times,” Review of International Studies FirstView (2013): 1–19; Immanuel Kant, “‘Toward 
Perpetual Peace,’” in In Practical Philosophy – Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. 
Gregor MJ (Trans.). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
17 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Final Report (New York: Commission 
on Human Security, 2003); United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 
1994. New Dimensions of Human Security (New York, NY: UNDP, 1994). 
18 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “Responsibility to Protect 
Report,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-
intervention/international-commission-intervention-state-sovereignty-responsibility-protect-
report/p24228. 
19 International Criminal Court, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (United 
Nations, July 17, 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm. 
20 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1939); Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order From 
Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: MacMillan, Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
“natural”; the primacy of national interest is simply a stage that can be superseded. Thus, according 
to this type of cosmopolitanism, the global concern for human security and human wellbeing, across 
state borders, is not just a moral prescription, but also a progressive movement that continues the 
historical process of expansion of communities of security governance. This movement has been 
responsible for the civilization of people and the decline of violent deaths in the world.21 
From these normative and ontological premises most cosmopolitan scholars and especially scholars 
of new wars prescribe that the international community has an obligation to respond to challenges 
in which fragile states offer opportunities for violent individuals, groups or governments to exploit 
civilians within their territories.22 Yet, this is not shared by all cosmopolitan scholars. Vincent, who 
is one of the first powerful advocates of individualistic, universal and general human rights, still 
holds that the respect for sovereignty is a necessary element of the functioning international system, 
while Falk is worried about the mixing of cosmopolitan and self-interested motives.23 Yet, for the 
sake of simplicity, in this article the prescription of cosmopolitan protection, will be associated with 
the cosmopolitan discourse.  
In this article the discourse strand on national selfishness uses the above definition of the realist 
national self-interest and the focus on the rights and interests of states. The reconstruction of the 
cosmopolitan discourse that will be studied as an international justification of Western 
interventions, uses the above definition of the ethical individualism, universalism and generality as 
                                                          
Paperbacks, 2011); Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era., 2012; Steven 
Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature. The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes. 
(London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2011). 
21 Elias, The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations.; Pinker, The Better 
Angels of Our Nature. The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes. 
22 Bellamy, “Syria Is a Failure of Commitment, Not Principle - The Washington Post”; Buchanan 
and Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime”; Duffield, Global Governance and the 
New Wars; Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era., 2012; Mello, 
“Review Article”; Münkler, The New Wars.; Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15.” 
23 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1974); Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving 
Kosovars.’” 
well as the ontological optimism of expanding zones of order. Most importantly, though, this article 
uses the cosmopolitan prescription of international protection of people regardless of borders, even 
though most cosmopolitan moralists do not claim it to be possible, while some cosmopolitan 
theorists of international relations explicitly claim it to be counter-productive.    
The assumption behind the motivation of this article is that a pure realist logic in world politics 
would not have justified conflicts in faraway places, conflicts that have little to do with the security 
of the states that ended up intervening in these conflicts. The assumption is, given that these 
interventions have escalated conflicts and made their target countries more fragile and thus less able 
to control violence, that the world would have been better off with pure realist thinking than with 
the mixes cosmopolitan and realist thinking. The other assumption behind the motive of this article 
is that a pure cosmopolitan mentality in the world would have allowed greater resourcing of 
protection of civilians, the build-up of genuine cosmopolitan agency for it and the allowing of 
agency for the protected people in the activity of protection. This could have served the world 
better, and it could have led the world to a global security community, something that the mixing of 
cosmopolitan and self-interested approaches failed to do. 
Data and methods 
This article assumes open futures (and genuine agency) and acknowledges the social constitution of 
the social reality in which we live, but still it takes intersubjective evidence seriously. Instead of 
using causal models, it reconstructs discursive processes, but tackles discourse analysis in an 
empirically responsible manner. According to Kivimäki,24 protection has failed to reduce violence 
and state fragility, and this must be partly related to the fact that cosmopolitan justifications that 
                                                          
24 Kivimäki, Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in 
Conflict.; see also Donald M. Snow, The Case against Military Intervention: Why We Do It and 
Why It Fails. (New York and London: Routledge, 2016); David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul. 
(London & Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002). 
make interventions possible in the international society have been entangled by selfish, “realist” 
national justifications.  
This study starts with the idea of treating text as data.25 This does not mean that texts that describe 
realities outside the text (such as one’s own commitment to a cause, one’s willingness to sacrifice, 
etc) as a true description of the world. Instead, as the focus is on logics that constitute legitimate 
political agency and action – causes that nations can mobilize allies to participate or citizens to 
sacrifice their lives to – we are looking at texts that constitute social realities rather than describing 
them. If the president of the United States criticizes the use of chemical weapons against civilians 
by the government of Syria, he articulates a reality in which at least he himself does not have an 
option to use chemical weapons against civilians without additional political costs. The speech act 
of the president also creates an identity for the US that is dissociated from the identity of actors that 
gas civilians. Similarly, when the president of the United States makes a distinction between 
operations that only target civilians (terrorism) and those that target military targets, his speech 
constitutes a reality within which at least the United States has to live in, of terrorism as a 
particularly repulsive political strategy and terrorists as an identity dissociated from the identity of 
the US.26 This way texts are and constitute the reality this article is studying, and thus they can be 
treated as evidence, even if they might be deceptive in their description of the reality outside the 
text.  
Due to the central role of the United States in military operations to protect global civilians, and due 
to the central role of the United States president in American foreign policy, I have selected the US 
                                                          
25 John Wilkerson and Andreu Casas, “Large-Scale Computerized Text Analysis in Political 
Science: Opportunities and Challenges.,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2017. 20:529–44 20 (2017): 529–
44. 
26 Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Lene Hansen, Security As Practice: Discourse Analysis And The Bosnian 
War (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006). 
government Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States27 as my primary data for discourse 
analysis. I have studied the entire period of the emergence of the discourse strand on protection 
starting from the last days of the cold war until the last published electronic versions of the 
compilation of the presidential papers (1989-2012),28 almost 30 million words.  
Studying the entire post-cold war period of the development of the discourse strand on protection 
requires methodological compromises: not all cases of intervention are similar, not all countries are 
similar, not all sentences justifying interventions are similar and not all the speakers of interventions 
(presidents) are similar. Thus, generalizing all protective interventions, generalizing all self-
interested clauses and all cosmopolitan clauses, etc.  loses a lot of detail and nuances. Furthermore, 
if text is considered evidence, then we cannot claim, by referring to this evidence, anything that we 
would like to, on the basis of our understanding of the historical context or on our understanding of 
the cultural context of policies. Interpretations can be developed on the basis historical or cultural 
contextual interpretations but they have to be tested against the texts, and this may rule out 
something a purely qualitative content analysis could reveal. Yet, the literature on cosmopolitan 
protection is full of selective studied that select sentences and cases that fit into their authors’ own 
argument. Such a strategy of research manages to keep track of important nuances and details. 
However, the intention here is to complement these existing studies with an approach that looks at 
the whole discursive development and makes no selections that cannot be transparently shown. 
Looking at all clauses with the word “protect”, in the entire period of the post-Cold War 
development of the discourse on protection makes the evidence more transparent and, thus, adds 
credibility to the findings. Given the already existing literature on specific cases, specific sentences, 
and specific nuances and details, there is space for an article that takes a more general look at the 
                                                          
27 US Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 
(Washington D.C.: US Governemnt Printing Office, various years). 
28 Year 2012 is, at the time of writing of this article, the latest year for which the USGPO 
compilation of presidential papers is available in NVivo compatible format.  
regularities in the development of the discourse on protection. Using this approach, I will 
substantiate my claims on discourses in a more transparent, rigorous and hopefully convincing 
manner than by simply selecting sentences from various sources or interpretations that refer to 
historical or cultural contexts whose selection I cannot transparently reveal.  
Since this article does not treat texts as something that describes reality as their authors see it, this 
study is committed to a different ontology and thus a different method than most computerized 
textual analyses. It is based on the idea that world politics is not dictated by exogenous, material 
realities. Instead, even the material reality becomes meaningful only through discourses. Thus, my 
research on the social realities of protection will have to start from the discourses that are, on the 
one hand, a product of human activity, but which also facilitate and constrain the imagination and 
opportunities of human agency. The interaction between agency, social realities and material 
realities cannot be revealed by a causal analysis that seeks explanations of developments based on 
exogenous material causes, nor can it be revealed by an analysis that does not recognize the 
importance of interpretations and discourses as social reality. Thus, such an analysis needs to look 
at meanings revealed in the texts. It must examine their relation to material, non-discursive events 
and structures as well as to purposive agency.  
To make sense of frameworks that legitimize and justify killing in a military operation for an 
audience, one needs to analyse the texts that the actor presents to this audience. In this way, one can 
understand the ontological and normative foundations and the ways in which these foundations are 
mobilized and associated with projects such as military intervention. One needs dispositive analysis 
to reveal the knowledge behind the actions and practices of cosmopolitan protection.29 However, 
when investigating apparently conflicting discourses, as is the case when one looks, on the one 
hand, at protection which tends to kill the ones it intends to protect, and on the other, at how selfish 
                                                          
29 Michael Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974). 
interests enter into altruistic discourse strands on protection, one will probably not find a coherent 
set of texts within which all these contradictions make sense. Instead, one needs to analyse the 
historically specific processes in which the discourse strands of different issue areas entangle and 
where compromises are needed and made within systems of decision-making, where dramatic 
events affect interpretation, and where different audiences can then be convinced by references to 
different types of normative and ontological premises.30  
We need to study the specific histories of interaction between action and social structures, in which 
actions are constituted by existing social structures and social structures are constituted by 
interpretative actions.31 If we look at ideational constructs such as humanitarian norms, as well as 
human, group or national and international pursuits to rescue civilians anywhere in the world, we 
can see that these discourses and pursuits were born and they developed and created the institutions 
that they needed to succeed through specific historical processes. In these processes, social and 
material realities enabled and obstructed, directed and focused purposes and norms of civilian 
protection. Other norms and structures that political norms created affected the path from ideas to 
outcomes. Studying this path will require “discursive process tracing,”32 in which the focus is on 
texts that reflect and create discursive events, such as changing types of arguments, norms and 
interpretations, rather than merely material events. These events naturally interact with changes in 
                                                          
30 Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a 
Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis.,” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2001), 32–62; Michael Meyer, “Between Theory, 
Method and Politics. Positioning of Approaches to CDA.,” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 
Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2001), 1–20; Ruth Wodak, “A 
Discourse-Historical Approach,” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2001), 63–94. 
31 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 41, no. 3 (July 1, 1987): 335–70. 
32 Krebs talks about narratives and process tracing in his article that tries to explain what makes a 
discourse successful and hegemonic. His method is relatively similar to my discursive process tracing 
except for the fact that Krebs uses content analysis of texts are his source of evidence, while my 
process tracing seeks greater transparency for my generalizations by means of computer-assisted 
word frequency and relational frequency analysis.  
material realities, and this interaction is well documented in texts related to political strategies on 
protection of civilians.  
When tracing the processes of discourse development there are junctures at which deviations to the 
cosmopolitan justification behind a policy enter the scene. Such junctures could be found:  
a. Within the internal logic of the discourse strand that deals with protection of civilians: how 
certain types of arguments are allowed while others are not, depending on the normative and 
ontological premises of the discourse and pre-agreed-upon premises for argumentation on which the 
discourse strand is based. This part of the analysis uses the lessons of so-called dispositive analysis, 
aimed at reconstructing and revealing the knowledge about identities (including oneself), 
relationships and structures lying behind discursive and non-discursive practices and reconstructing 
non-discursive practices which have led to the manifestations/materializations and the knowledge 
contained therein.33 
b. In the entanglements of discourse strands34 on protection and other interrelated issues. These 
entanglements are meaningful for the development of the normative and ontological premises of the 
discursive strand of protection. How, for example, the discourse strand on victimhood is used to 
depoliticize protection in the entanglements that expose discussion on protection to the ontologies 
and ethics of debates on victimhood (or criminality, or security threats, or democracy) affects the 
way in which the ownership of protection is shared.  
                                                          
33 Joannah Caborn, “On the Methodology of Dispositive Analysis,” Critical Approaches to 
Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 1 (1): 1, no. 1 (2007): 115–23; MIchael Foucault, The Order 
of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Ronald R. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise 
and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus,” International Organization 
FirstView (June 2015): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000181; Krebs, Narrative and 
the Making of US National Security. 
34 Jäger, “Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical 
Discourse and Dispositive Analysis.,” 47–48; Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier, “Analysing 
Discourses and Dispositives: A Foucauldian Approach to Theory and Methodology,” in Ruth 
Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2001), 
122–23. 
c. In the interaction of the text with audiences as part of the discourse context of protection.35 
It is clear that especially domestic and international audiences, rural national voters vs. international 
diplomats have very different ethical and ontological expectations of the US president. Thus, texts 
produced for these two audiences affect the development of the discourse strand. The requirements 
imposed on the president or another decision-maker in US foreign politics based on a situation 
presented to a domestic or international audience affects US policy in varying ways, since 
consistency in the statements and knowledge revealed in texts and actions is necessary for 
credibility. Sometimes, interpretations of the realities of world politics are created to solve problems 
created by the need for consistency. US presidents, for example, tend to favour worldviews in 
which national interests can be reconciled with international responsibilities, and sometimes the 
need for consistency pushes them towards interpretations that are not optimal in terms of credibility, 
or ones that can only be sustained by hiding the evidence against them.  
d. In the interaction of the discourse with the institutional settings to which they belong. The 
question of differing audiences is closely linked with the question of the structure of decision-
making.36 The president primarily needs to persuade Congress to get funding for foreign operations, 
and the nation’s voters to keep the mandate and decision-making power on foreign operations. 
When the knowledge behind domestic and international audiences clashes it is understandable that 
compromises need to be made, primarily at the expense of global ontologies and ethics.  
e. In events and discourse histories.37 Crises in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia are often 
mentioned as the most important historical discourse contexts that affect the development of a 
                                                          
35 Jäger, “Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical 
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36 Rene von Schomberg and Kenneth Baynes, Discourse and Democracy: Essays on Habermas’s 
Between Facts and Norms (SUNY Press, 2002), 37. 
37 Meyer, “Between Theory, Method and Politics. Positioning of Approaches to CDA.” 
discourse strand. The globalist ontologies of the immediate post-cold war period were difficult to 
reconcile with the well-published events in Mogadishu in March 1993, when 18 US soldiers were 
killed. At the same time the experienced consequences of the failure to react forcefully in Bosnia 
and Rwanda have served to boost interventionist arguments.  
Despite dealing with interpretative reality and social constructs, in my investigation I have refused 
to make a random selection of what is important or to put forth loose claims of the representative 
quality of particular constructs. Instead, I have mapped discursive developments using computer-
assisted textual analysis. For this I have used the NVivo text analysis program.  
First, I selected proxy words for different discourse strands and used word frequency analyses to 
reveal how different discourse strands are related to each other and how this relationship develops. I 
have looked at the association between word frequencies of words “protect”, “humanitarian”, 
“innocent”, “victim”, “threat”, “civilian”, “revenge”, “terror” and “crime” in order to investigate 
discursive entanglements.  
Second, I coded clauses that deal with protection (selecting them by searching for the world 
“protect” in its different forms) for the types of threats against which protection is needed. First, I 
ruled out instances covering protection of Americans and US institutions against non-external (for 
example, protection of American children against crime, decadence or tobacco and the like.),38 non-
life-threatening threats (protection of US tobacco farmers, economic protectionism, etc.) and 
unintentional threats to the US and Americans (pandemics, securing of international traffic against 
technical dangers). Somehow the above-mentioned threats are not related to the discourse strands of 
foreign policy and security. Any other threats have been included in my further analysis. Since the 
environmental threats have a special place in foreign and security policies I have coded the 
                                                          
38 Since the threat of terrorism in US discourse is clearly externalized, even when the perpetrators are 
US citizens, I ruled all terrorist threats as external despite the fact that in the 1990s these were often 
seen as criminal threats rather than international political conspiratorial threats. 
environment as a separate referent object of protection without making an artificial distinction 
between domestic and international (after all, environmental problems do not recognize state 
borders). I have considered them when making calculations on the associations between various 
discourses.  
The next phase of relational textual analysis focuses on the referent object of protection: that is, 
who is being protected. I have done this technically by looking at the grammatical object of the 
word “protect”. In some cases, though, the referent object of protection needs to be followed further 
in the paragraph and the speech/letter/interview. In this way, all clauses with the word “protect” 
were included in this relational coding, which classified the referent objects into four categories: 1. 
Protection of the US state and its people and institutions from intentional external danger, 2. 
Protection of allies from comparable danger, Protection of the environment, and 4. Protection 
crucial to the survival and wellbeing of people and institutions in states outside the US alliance, 
from internal and external, intentional and non-intentional threats (that is to say, genuine 
cosmopolitan protection; such as protection of citizens in developing countries from terror, dictators 
and criminals, but also from developmental problems).39  
In order to be sure of the unambiguity of my coding rules I have had four students who have 
replicated parts of my coding so that I was able to verify that the same sentences always get the 
same coding. 40 For the sake of transparency and to allow the replication and further development 
and use of my data the coding on NVivo of the presidential papers and the quantitative data on word 
and relational frequencies are openly available in NVivo, Stata formats respectively, from the 
                                                          
39 I classified the protection of terrorists by rogue states in the category of protection that I have ruled 
out in the beginning to maintain the normative relevance of this category of protection.  
40 For help with the development of the nodes and testing the unambiguity of the coding rules, I am 
grateful to Riccardo Boscherini, Thomas Brewis, Maddy Holley and Astrid Vikström, 
replication data depository of the University of Bath, Research Data Archive at 
http://doi.org/10.15125/12345. 
In an investigation of how different discourse strands relate to one another, and how the primacy of 
a cosmopolitan referent object develops, it is not only possible to map mega developments in the 
discourse strand on protection and thus show what is hegemonic and what is not hegemonic in the 
discourse. It is also possible to identify periods when something worthy of qualitative analysis 
occurs in the discourse strand on protection. Thus, the main qualitative analysis reaching deeper 
into the meanings in the texts can be based on something more than my own subjective 
understandings.  
National and cosmopolitan justifications for humanitarian military interventions 
To get a first glimpse of the extent to which protection of civilians is related to selfish national 
interests, it will be possible to correlate the frequencies of different words that relate to the 
protection discourse strand, humanitarian discourse strand and national security discourse strand. 
This could be a rough beginning to an analysis of the origins of the political protection discourse 
strand.  
The word “humanitarian” and the word “civilian” seem to be words that are related to the human 
security debate and humanitarian discourse strand. Their frequencies (number of occurrences 
divided by the number of occurrences of all words) are very significantly correlated (.381**, 
p=.008, n=47).41 Surprisingly, however, the standardized relative frequency of “protection” is not 
associated with the frequency of humanitarian words, such as “humanitarian” and “civilian”. There 
is an insignificant correlation between word frequencies of the words “protect” and “civilian” (.162, 
                                                          
41 When looking at word frequencies, I look at each word and at words that stem from them (protect, 
protected, protection etc.). Most of the variations focused upon in word frequency analyses here are 
not normal (Gaussian), and thus all the correlations of word frequencies referred to here are non-
parametric correlations (Spearman). Frequencies are adjusted to the biannual data from the Public 
Papers of the Presidents.  
p=.276, n=47) but a greater, yet still insignificant, negative correlation (-.184, p=216, n=47) is 
found between the frequency of words “humanitarian” and “protect.” So whenever one of the 
discourse strands is central to the presidential debate, the other is not more central.  
However, the word “innocent” is moderately strongly, and statistically very significantly, associated 
with “protection” (.624**, p~.0000, n=47). While there is a significant victimhood discourse in the 
US post-911 political debate, the word victim is hardly ever used with reference to the United States 
as a victim. Instead the innocence of American victims of terrorist violence was used to justify 
American response against terrorists. Victims in presidential speeches, at the same time, are almost 
always peoples from fragile developing countries. US victimhood on 11 September 2001 was 
treated as a declaration of war and the innocence of Americans on 11 September 2001 activated the 
US response.   
The word “innocent” is used to articulate an ontology in which conflicts are between innocent 
people and predatory enemies. This ontology is important for the justification of military 
operations, and thus, the word “innocent” is also very significantly associated with the justification 
of ongoing military operations (but less so with new operations). The number of existing US 
military operations is moderately correlated in a statistically significant manner with the frequency 
of the word “innocent” (.447*, p=0016, n=47). The fact that the more humanitarian word “victim” 
is not significantly associated with protection discourse, and that it is negatively associated with 
existing US operations (-.395* .006, n=47), suggests that the conclusion of the discourse strand on 
innocence involves the articulation of a black and white reality with good guys and bad guys, rather 
than it being a sign of an association between the discourse strand on protection and that on 
humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism. The strength of the negative correlation between existing 
operations and the frequency of the word “victim” is also naturally related to the hesitation of any 
administration to reveal victimhood (ones own or the enemy’s) in relation to existing military 
operations.  
It seems that there is no significant correlation between the launching of military operations and the 
frequency of the word “humanitarian” or the word “civilian” in presidential papers.42 Thus it seems 
clear that the humanitarian discourse strand does not have a strong association with the decision to 
launch a military operation to protect civilians in a far-away country.  
The frequency of “civilian” and “humanitarian” are not very significantly correlated with the 
number of existing military operations either, even though the correlation there is more significance 
than in the case of new operations. In the case of the word “civilian”, the correlation is significantly 
positive, while for “humanitarian” it is significantly negative (“humanitarian: -,312, p=.033, n=47; 
“civilian”:.335*, p=.021, n=47). Thus, if there are any cosmopolitan considerations related to US 
protective operations, they seem to relate to the continuation, that is, ex post justification and 
declarations for specific audiences.  
However, the frequency of “protection” is strongly associated with the frequencies of word “threat” 
from a more militaristic, selfish and security-based threat discourse strand. The correlations 
between the two relative (per mil) frequencies is 0.701** (p.~.0000, n=47). Thus, clearly, the 
protection discourse strand seems closely linked to the threat discourse strand. This, in turn, is often 
selfish and nationalist and bases social realities on security issues rather than focusing on building 
order.  
The entanglement between protection and the militarized threat discourse strand becomes especially 
strong once the cosmopolitan protection debate begins to justify military operations, in particular 
since 1999. From 1999 until 2012, only once did the frequency of the words "protect" and "threat" 
not move in the same direction in a year-to-year comparison. The year in question was 2001, where 
                                                          
42 When talking about protective operations, I refer to the eight operations in which the US 
participated, as listed in the introduction. Since political acceptance is only required for starting an 
operation, and not for individual strikes, I code the start of an operation in a country as one start. 
When talking about ongoing operations, I code an operation as ongoing if military action continues 
during the time period of the document collection in question. Thus, each country operation is counted 
only once, regardless of the number of airstrikes or other operations that year.  
the frequency of "protection" decreased while the frequency of the word “threat” increased. Years 
when the frequency of “threat” rose more (or declined less) than the frequency of the word 
“protect” were 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2011, all years for new American protective operations 
(Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Libya). Years when the frequency of “protection” rose more 
than the frequency of “threat” were 1992, 1995, 1996 (threat declined), in the vicinity of times 
when many opportunities for humanitarian protection existed in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, but 
the US opted against. Furthermore, Graph 1 shows the bi/tri-annual development of word 
frequencies and suggests that the entanglement between the two discourses is of the nature where 
threat speech changes first and is then followed by protection speech. The rise of threat speech 
happened instantly after 11 September 2001, while the rise of protection speech followed six 
months later. Again in 2003, threat speech was prevalent at the beginning of the year, when the 
operation in Iraq was discussed, and protection speech followed only somewhat later. Thus, it 
seems that threat rather than the need to protect justifies military operations.  
Graph  1: 
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(launching of new operations .315*, p=0.031, n=47, and ongoing operations, .408**, p=0.004, 
n=47). The word “military” has an even higher correlation with the launching of new operations, 
while it has a lower correlation with ongoing operations (launching of new operations .348*, 
p=0.017, n=47, and ongoing operations, .384**, p=0.008, n=47). This, too, suggests that while 
threat speech and protection speech are strongly entangled, it is the threat speech that is more 
related to the decision to enter a new military operation, while protection speech is more related to 
the ex post justification of existing operations. The frequency of “protect” shows no significant 
correlation with new or ongoing operations. Thus, the operations that are officially, internationally 
justified as operations for the protection of civilians are related to the security-based discourse on 
threats and military, rather than the cosmopolitan discourse strand on “humanitarian” or 
“protection”. 
If we then look at the referent object of protection in presidential papers, we can see that while the 
share of the cosmopolitan referent object of protection is not associated with new or ongoing 
protective military operations, the share of the national referent object (the frequency with which 
US security is mentioned as the object of protection as a percentage of the frequency of all objects 
of protection) is very significantly, and strongly associated with the number of ongoing protective 
military operations (.632*, p~.0000, n=49). Thus, it seems, there is a much stronger association 
between national values to be protected and the willingness to engage in protective interventions in 
faraway countries. While in the international fora the United States gives cosmopolitan rationales, 
the main priority in presidential discourse for protection is national. Thus, the protection frame and 
the actions which it is used to justify are closely connected to threats and the need to protect the 
United States rather than the countries where protection takes place.  
Thus, it seems likely that the political discourse strand on cosmopolitan protection of global 
civilians as well as operations that are assumed to be justified by cosmopolitan spirit, are influenced 
by nationalist concerns. Global civilians are part of the international justification rather than being 
an important part of the real justification and motive of interventions. This discovery lends support 
to Falk’s claim that protective interventions are strategic in motivation, and humanitarian only in 
rationalization.43 
How do the realist and hegemonic fallacies contaminate the cosmopolitan cause? 
When trying to understand why there is this association between the security discourse strand and 
protection, rather than protection and the humanitarian discourse strand, we need to explore a 
qualitative analysis of authoritative texts. It seems clear that the realist fallacy of the natural quality 
of national self-interest, and the hegemonic fallacy which says that US and international interests 
are identical and that the world is in need of US leadership go a long way in making sense of US 
selfishness intertwined with cosmopolitan protection. Still, the situation emphasized by the realists 
– that there are decision-making systems to which the US president must cater, also seem to play 
their part in the selfishness. Clinton, who was personally more inclined think in cosmopolitan terms 
often explicitly referred to these national institutional constraints: a president has a constitutional 
responsibility to the nation only (Clinton, 1996a, p. 1787; Clinton, 1996x, p. 154). There, the 
remedy would not simply be a new way of thinking but the strengthening of representative 
institutions of global governance.  
Many of the arguments that justify selfish motives for protection in world politics relate to the 
realist misunderstanding of the relationship between potentiality and actuality and assume that the 
actual situation proves the “realities” and the non-existence of alternative potentials. The fact that 
states behave selfishly is often seen as proof of the reality of selfishness in world politics. Thus, 
there is no potential for cosmopolitan thought in world politics unless it directly serves national 
interest 44  Thus, even the most humanitarian of missions overseas, such as the US mission to 
                                                          
43 Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving Kosovars.’” 
44 This logic of thought is quite evident from the very beginning of classical works of realism, see 
for example, Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
promote democracy and attempt to assist Haiti in a humanitarian emergency must be realistically 
understood as being motivated by national interest. This is clear in Clinton’s statement: “My first 
concern, and the most important one, obviously, is for the safety and security of our troops. General 
Shalikashvili and Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, our commander in Haiti, have made it clear to 
all involved that the protection of American lives is our first order of business.”45 Yet, the historical 
context of Clinton’s Haiti policy is one in which the US interests as the leader of the free world 
merge US power interests with the developmental interests of Haiti. This entanglement of 
hegemonic interests and the assumed interests of the hegemonic subjects is another discursive 
dynamic that deviates cosmopolitan policies towards selfish interests.  
There is an American tradition of global leadership, which does naturalize selfishness, even in 
global governance.  However, cosmopolitan protection also meets with obstacles in the institutions 
of decision-making. When leading the world, the US president must request funding from 
Congress. Constitutionally, the president must keep in mind that only the Congress can declare 
wars, while the legality of presidential decision-making will be monitored by an independent 
judiciary. Furthermore, when making decisions on security in Iraq, the US president has a mandate 
based not on Iraqi, but on US national and human concerns. This comes through in the US 
protection discourse. According to Clinton, “Every office I have ever held of the public trust, from 
being attorney general of my state to being governor to being president, required me to swear an 
oath to protect the people I was elected to serve, to give people the security they need to live up to 
the most of their God given potential.”46 Bush and Obama repeated the same thing, almost like a 
mantra. According to Bush, “[The] president’s job is not to pass a ‘‘global test.’’ The president’s 
                                                          
45 William J. Clinton, “Remarks Prior to a Breakfast With President Jimmy Carter, General Colin 
Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn September 19, 1994,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States 1994, Book 2 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 1575. 
46 William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Environmental Protection in Baltimore, Maryland August 8, 
1995,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1995, Book 2 (Washington D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1996), 1216. 
job is to protect the American people.”47 Obama clarified the relationship between the institutional 
setting and the cosmopolitan mission most accurately when he said, “As President, my greatest 
responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country 
or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the 
United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have 
suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.”48 
This institutional commitment to realist state thinking in American foreign policy limits the US 
commitment to global democracy and cosmopolitanism.49 It introduced selfish national interest in 
protection since the US constituencies were, in reality, not as cosmopolitan as Beck and others 
suggest.50 According to Mueller, American voters would be willing to sacrifice a large number of 
foreigners in order to rescue a single US soldier.51  
National arguments, however, cannot convince international audiences. To remedy the 
contradiction between internationally acceptable global humanitarian ambitions and US national 
interest, presidents – at least until President Trump – have tried to propose that national interests 
can merge with what the world needs. Thus, what is good for the United States is good for 
humanity. This need for consistency in speeches to domestic and international audiences pushes 
interpretations that put protection into a format where there is affinity between national and 
                                                          
47 George W. Bush, “Remarks in Farmington Hills, Michigan October 6, 2004,” in Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 3 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2005), 2383. 
48 Barack Obama, “Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strategies for Afghanistan 
and Pakistan  March 27, 2009,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2009, Book 
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50 Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision. 
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international interest. If an operation protects national and international interests simultaneously, 
then it can be justified to the Congress and the voters as well as to the UN General Assembly. A 
classical American way of merging national and international interest is to claim that there is a 
causal relationship between global liberty and US security. George W. Bush used this tradition in 
his speech to soldiers: “When President Truman spoke here for the 150th anniversary of West Point, 
he told the class of 1952, ‘We can’t have lasting peace unless we work actively and vigorously to 
bring about conditions of freedom and justice in the world.’ That same principle continues to guide 
us in today’s war on terror. Our strategy to protect America is based on a clear premise: The 
security of our Nation depends on the advance of liberty in other nations. On September the 11th, 
2001, we saw that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could 
bring murder and destruction to our country. And we learned an important lesson: Decades of 
excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe. 
So long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place 
where terrorists foment resentment and threaten American security.”52 While it may be so that 
democracies do not fight one another, the policy of enforcement of democracy has so far created 
enemies rather than friends for the United States, and if we look at current statistics on US conflict 
fatalities, it is clear that this policy has been a dominant reason for a majority of them.   
Another often-used way of merging cosmopolitan and national priorities has been simply to claim 
that objects of US protection want what Americans want. President George W. Bush, for example, 
claimed that, “Most Iraqis, by far, reject violence and oppose dictatorship. In forums where Iraqis 
have met to discuss their political future and in all the proceedings of the Iraqi Governing Council, 
Iraqis have expressed clear commitments. They want strong protections for individual rights. They 
                                                          
52 George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West 
Point, New York May 27, 2006,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2006, 
Book 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1039. 
want their independence, and they want their freedom.”53 However, Bush failed to tell his audience 
that according to Western polls the people the US protected in Iraq did not want that protection.54  
The nature of protective operations are often decorated with humanitarian and legal concepts that 
poorly describe the reality on the ground. According to President Bush’s oft-repeated claim, the US 
was bringing terrorists to justice. All the while, concerns could be raised that they were mostly 
killing people that their insufficient intelligence capacity suspected of militancy: “the best way to 
protect the homeland is to stay on the offense, is to keep pressure on these people. We’ve brought 
75 percent of Al Qaida to justice, and we’re still working.”55 The means the US needed to use and 
the outcomes of US protective actions were also often intentionally misrepresented to bring national 
priorities and humanitarian priorities closer to one another: “Because we acted, torture chambers are 
closed. Because we acted, countries like Libya understood we meant business, and they voluntarily 
disarmed. Because we acted, there is a democracy beginning to grow in a part of the world that 
needs freedom and hope. Because we acted, this man’s weapons programs will never be.”56 
Perhaps the most dangerous deceptive confusion of cosmopolitan and national interests is related to 
US oil interests. By decorating national interest in energy security with cosmopolitan logic, it has 
been possible to legitimize operations and to support regimes that in reality serve the US rather than 
cosmopolitan interests. The post-cold war legitimation of US energy interests has used 
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cosmopolitan discourse strand of protection since the very beginning of the post-cold war era. 
According to George H.W. Bush, “Iraq's aggression is not just a challenge to the security of our 
friends in the Gulf but to the new partnership of nations we're all hoping to build. Energy security is 
national security for us and for every country. And third: We're here to protect innocent lives, 
including American lives.”57 Thus, we see a need expressed for cosmopolitan legitimacy for 
operations used to secure energy supplies and the need for nationalist legitimacy for operations to 
enforce globally beneficial norms against invasion in the Middle East.  
If cosmopolitan norms are protected only when they suit the interests of the powerful, they easily 
become contaminated and their universal value is lost. Cosmopolitan norms in general were made 
suspect of being instruments of hegemonic intervention and interference. Naturally, this hinders 
progress in the cosmopolitanization of the world and, in part, makes the escalation of protection 
wars more feasible.  
While selfishness in protection deviates the cosmopolitan project the approach by which national 
interest can become muddled with cosmopolitan humanitarian interests tends to escalate conflicts.  
  
11 September 2001 and the contribution of “innocence”, “revenge” and “justice” to 
selfishness in protection   
Even though the US presidential papers reveal the realist and hegemonic fallacies in the discourse 
strand on protection already from the beginning of the post-cold war era, it seems clear that military 
protection of civilians – war activities for the protection of citizens of fragile and dictatorial states – 
did not start immediately after the end of the cold war. On the contrary, theorists on new wars 
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November 22, 1990,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, Book 2 
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 1667. 
complain that the very reason that new wars erupted was the abandonment of fragile states by 
developed countries: “(T)he end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an apparently reduced 
willingness and ability to control internal violence … Governments and potential insurgents no 
longer have ideological patrons who provide them with the wherewithal to commit violence and 
then expect some influence over how that violence is carried out.”58 According to Münkler “war has 
become endemic mainly in regions where a major empire held sway and then fell apart.”59 The 
willingness to see global civilians as important referent objects of protection, in conflicts where 
they could be protected, developed only slowly after the collapse of the ideological cold war 
rationale for intervention had disappeared.  
The word frequency of the word “protection” in US presidential papers rose at the end of the 1990s 
and peaked during the period with the most intensive military interventionism between 2001 and 
2007 (see Graph 3).  
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However, protection always seemed to define US citizens as its primary referent object, and it 
seems that the attack on American citizens on 11 September 2001 gave this nationalist orientation 
some new legitimacy. As Graph 3 shows, national protection of Americans, who now were innocent 
victims of global threats, rose sharply after the terrorist attack on American soil.60 The above 
mentioned association between protection and protective operations with the word frequency of the 
word “innocent” (in all its forms) in presidential papers can be specified. Innocence was not 
something that linked protection with humanitarian discourse strand, but simply something that 
became meaningful for protection when Americans themselves became the innocent victims.  
Graph 4:61 
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However, as Graph 4 reveals that President Bush did not refer to global civilians in his speeches on 
protection but was very specific about his reference to the protection of Americans. Thus, it is likely 
that the rise of protection discourse in 2001 was a result of the terrorist attack rather than of the global 
discourse on cosmopolitan protection. 
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As suggested by the relational coding of presidential papers in Graph 4, the situation in which the 
United States mainland was violated by a global force that targeted civilians and the innocence of 
the victims justified completely new levels of selfishness and nationalist orientations in the US 
global governance of security. As the change of referent object in sentences of protection suggests, 
the main change in the US approach took place only after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. 
This is also when interventions to protect turned much deadlier,62 while the previous operations in 
Sierra Leone (by the UK) and Kosovo were much more successful in the protection of civilians.  
The unfortunate confusion in which innocent victims are seen as immune to critique, as if one can 
only be either a perpetrator or a victim, but not both, is not brought to light in the academic 
literature on cosmopolitan protection. Yet, Joseph A. Amato, from outside the study of international 
relations, has derived this tendency to use victimhood as a claim with a political potency that 
purifies and justifies, from the Christian narratives that have been used to make hardship more 
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tolerable.63 While the crucified Christ has been the ultimate cultural reference, in international 
relations the narrative of holocaust has been the representative case of victimhood64 that has 
justified Israeli policies to secure the Jewish people. The moral problems that this “purifying” 
victimhood poses have been dealt in academic literature,65 just not in the cosmopolitan study of 
conflicts and new wars. In the Kaldorian conception of new wars, there is a conflicting party that 
benefits from violence and wants to continue the state of warfare as a social condition (rather than 
using violence instrumentally and conditional to compliance of the enemy), while the victim is 
simply on the receiving end of suffering.66  
The fact that innocent victimhood in political literature focusses on actors (innocent people vs. 
perpetrators) rather than on violent deeds has meant that the terrorist attack on the US has not 
sparked a reaction against terror and violence but rather against terrorists. As a result, instead of 
preventing violence the discourse strand on innocence has legitimized violence. Bush’s statements 
after the terror attack were explicit on the association between innocence and the right to act 
aggressively in self-interest. President Bush portrays the September 11 attack as a personal tragedy 
for himself, making himself a victim. Throughout the last four months of 2004, he repeats this 40 
times in the presidential papers with minimal variations, always saying that after the incident of 
September 11, he has woken up every morning thinking of the best strategy to protect the country or 
its people, always emphasizing that he will be prepared to do “whatever it takes” to protect 
America. This, in a very concrete sense, shows the discursive path from victimhood to rough, 
selfish means of protection. On one of these occasions, when he explained September 11 as his 
personal tragedy, he experiences personal trauma due to his role as the prime protector of the 
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country: “On September the 14th, 2001, I stood in the ruins of the Twin Towers. It helped shape my 
thinking about my duty to protect you. I’ll never forget that day. There were workers in hardhats 
there yelling at me at the top of their lungs, ‘‘Whatever it takes.’’ I was doing my best to console 
those who were coming out of that rubble. They had grime and dirt all over them. I looked a guy 
right in the eye—he had bloodshot eyes—and he said, ‘‘Don’t let me down.’’ I wake up every 
morning since that day thinking about how to better protect America. I will never relent in doing 
what is necessary to secure this country and to protect you, whatever it takes.”67 In this quotation 
Bush does not use the word victim; it seems that the US identity was not that of an object of 
aggression, but that instead, the attack had invigorated rather than made US agency passive: the US 
needed to get even rather than be protected by others. So, the purifying and justifying part of 
victimhood alone affected US foreign policy, while the objectifying part of victimhood did not. 
Perhaps it was the part of victimhood that creates passivity and objectivity that prevented US 
presidents from using the word “victim” in reference to the United States.  
The path from innocent victimhood to selfishness entailed at least three steps:  
1. Justification of military means over a broader territorial space. The fact that the enemy was 
not bound to a territory meant that self-defence covered the whole globe. George W. Bush 
repeated how important it was to stay on the offensive:68 “We’re hunting the Al Qaida 
terrorists wherever they hide, from Pakistan to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa to 
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Iraq.”69 The argument has its academic version in Kaldor’s cosmopolitanism in regard to the 
nature of new wars: “it is no longer possible to contain war geographically. Zones of peace 
and zones of war exist side by side in the same territorial space."70 
2. Perceived justification of nationally motivated action. Bush mocked John Kerry for his 
views, according to which the US might require international acceptance for its global 
operations. “When my opponent first ran for Congress, he argued that American troops 
should be deployed only at the directive of the United Nations … Over the years, Senator 
Kerry has looked for every excuse to constrain America’s action in the world.”71  
3. Perceived justification of US violations of agreed universal norms and laws on warfare and 
torture: “Treaties make no sense. There’s only one thing: get them before they get us, to stay 
on the offensive.”72  
All these effects of innocence on a US understanding of protection in world politics diverted an idea 
that had started as cosmopolitan protection in a direction where selfish interests, rather than 
humanitarian considerations, dictated policies. The association between the threat discourse strand 
and the protection discourse strand in Graph 1 and the rise of the US as a referent agent of 
protection in protection speech (Graph 3) is partly explained by the entanglement of the protection 
discourse strand with the innocence discourse strand after the terrorist incident on 11 September 
2001.  
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11 September 2001 and the contribution of “law enforcement” to selfishness in protection   
In addition to the discursive entanglement with victimhood, the debate on protection was also 
entangled with the debate on crime and law enforcement after the terrorist attack on the US. 
Americans had been victims of criminal violence in their own country before, but now victimhood 
entered into international security and gave the US a new identity as an innocent and actively 
revengeful victim of criminal international terrorism, within their own country. Previously, US 
safety from crime and domestic acts of terror could be separated from the defence effort that was 
aided by the presence of oceans protecting US external security. According to Bush: “In our 
country it used to be that oceans could protect us …. September the 11th, that changed. America is 
now a battleground in the war on terror.”73 This interpretation of the September 11 incident created 
an entanglement of the crime and terror discourse strands: the heroes protecting Americans from 
violence, who once came exclusively from the national police forces, were now defending 
Americans against international terrorism. Consequently, the rules of crime prevention were 
exported to the world of global protection against terror.  
The discourse strands on crime and terror employed a somewhat similar logic already in the 1990s, 
as crime was prevented without dialogue with criminals by strengthening the rule of law.74 
Interaction with criminals would have articulated social realities in which the existence of the rule 
of law would have been questionable, and thus, action was based on enforcement of the law. 
Intelligence by surveillance shifted focus from potential enemies (unfriendly countries) to potential 
criminals (terrorists AND ordinary citizens), and militarized means of law enforcement spread from 
                                                          
73 George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister John Howard of 
Australia and an Exchange With Reporters February 10, 2003,” in Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States, 2003, Book 1. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2004), 
152. 
74 for the same logic in the terrorism discourse strand, see George W. Bush, “Remarks in a 
Discussion at Mid-States Aluminum Corporation in Fond Du Lac, Wisconsin July 14, 2004,” in 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2004, Book 2. (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 2005), 1317. 
military operations in enemy territories into domestic crowd control. The Patriot Act of 2001 
merged the worlds of the intelligence community and law enforcement and allowed intelligence 
sharing, moving the use of CIA/NSA intelligence into courtrooms in order to prevent terrorism.75 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security on 25 November 2002 merged the 
bureaucracies of crime prevention and prevention of international terrorism, making international 
protection from terrorism a national priority and making a national agency responsible.  
In the international protection discourse strand, the national priorities and agency can be seen in 
Graphs 1 and 3. The new priority of terror in the discourse can be seen in presidential papers (see 
Graph 4) as well as in the subsequent tripling of resources for terror prevention during the first two 
years after 11 September 200176 as well as in the new mandates received by various domestic 
institutions (law enforcement and more) in the Homeland Security Presidential Directives and the 
sharper focus on the national priority of terror prevention.77  Graph 4 also reveals that the role of the 
terrorism discourse strand in US national governance was relatively similar to that held by the law 
enforcement discourse strand, since the rise of the terrorism discourse abolished the need for the 
dominance of the crime prevention discourse.  
 
Graph 4:  
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Since crime prevention was mainly a national issue (with the exception of international crime – a 
rarer problem), it was understandable that the discursive strand was national: there was no need for 
UN acceptance to employ measures to prevent national crime,78 even though – after 11 September – 
the criminal resided outside the US. The objectives of such prevention were thus national, and so 
were the institutions. While the entanglement of crime and terror discourses resulted from a non-
discursive event on September 11 (this event, however, became real and meaningful in the 
interpretations embedded in existing discourses), the discourse gave rise to material and 
institutional changes in resourcing and legal and institutional facilitation of nationalist global policy 
to protect the world from terrorism. The discourse of protection of people from criminal terror 
spoke through the new officials in their roles as global law enforcers, allowing them agency for the 
further transformation of protection, but within a set of rules and expectations that their new 
institutional and legal framework allowed and the discourse strand on protection motivated.  
The idea of global law enforcement also moved from the debate on national crime onto the 
international scene, thus legitimizing individual punishment by the US of terrorists in sovereign 
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countries that were not necessarily hostile to the US, and that had little say on US law enforcement 
within their territory. Drone warfare seems the clearest consequence of the discursive entanglement 
of the terror and protection discourse strand with that on crime. Nationalistically motivated and 
authorized global law enforcement was added to the toolbox of US “cosmopolitan protection,” 
despite that fact that, in the international setting, legitimate legal norms were far less clear. Again, 
the right of the US to enforce its law and its interpretation of international law was not shared by the 
people of the areas where this law enforcement was conducted. As a result, conflicts escalated and 
the people cosmopolitan protection was supposed to shield died as a result of the protection.  
Conclusion 
The interaction between material, institutional and discursive realities and the actions of purposeful 
politicians and voters is a circle with no beginning or an end. Yet, if we try to understand the 
emergence of the originally cosmopolitan protection debate in post-cold war US and Western 
foreign policies, we will have to take certain historically generated social institutional and material 
realities as the point of departure. For presidents who wanted to protect civilians in Rwanda, 
Somalia, or Bosnia, the institutional point of departure was determined by the necessity of getting 
their resources and legal framework of operations from the nation’s elected legislators and their 
mandate from the nation’s voters. As suggested by Falk (2003), and empirically shown in this 
article, this was difficult.  
This institutional setting interacted with the realist debate, even though realism assumed that instead 
of the socio-historical constitution of this changeable reality, national primacy was the natural way. 
The strategy of combining international and national interests so that the US could justify its global 
operations both in Congress and in the UN propelled the official rhetoric (which often primarily 
needed to convince national rather than international constituencies) towards interpretations that 
emphasized that global and national interests were identical.  
Entanglements with national debates on the military and law enforcement directed the protection 
discourse strand in a direction that was even more problematic. If US power was necessary for the 
humanitarian order of the world, then US global law enforcement and retribution of its victimhood 
was acceptable. Since no citizens of a sovereign nation can accept law enforcement from afar on 
their own territory, especially from a nation that does not subject itself to many of the existing 
global norms, protection mixed with selfish nationalistic norms escalated rather than reduced 
violence in the world. Thus, a tracing of the discourse strand on protection by means of textual and 
discourse analysis reveals a partial explanation for the fact that US interventions have tended to 
contribute to the increase of conflict fatalities and state fragility.   
The confusion of realist and neo-realist ideas with cosmopolitan ones has been possible partly due 
to the sloppiness of the cosmopolitan theory and the theory of new wars on the question of who is 
the legitimate agent of protection. If the normative regime on cosmopolitan protection had been 
clear on the question of agency, if it had insisted on the democratic principle that people and their 
values can only be protected by institutions that represent these people, it would have been more 
difficult for nations to mix selfish interests with operations that claim cosmopolitan legitimacy. The 
agency of protection and the agency of defining who to protect and what values to protect, point up 
a dangerous blind spot in cosmopolitan thinking of many theorists of international relations. This 
blind spot allows selfish nationalism to creep into the implementation of cosmopolitan protection. If 
we pay no attention to agency, we will see no problem in agents getting their resources and their 
mandate from national constituencies that determine who to protect, how to protect and which 
values to protect. This exposes cosmopolitan protection to mixing up national and global interests, 
even if “the politics of human has become the civil religion, the faith of the United States 
itself.”  Thus, even if US enforcement of cosmopolitan norms is not purely an enforcement of 
selfish interests, as Beck suggests,79 it is still an enforcement of the global norms tarnished by the 
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selfish national interests of those who enforce such norms. The idea of democracy and the Kantian 
version of cosmopolitanism80 that commits to the general contours of the social contract tradition, 
advises us against forgetting the agency of politics or protection. Only ownership of the norms and 
their enforcement by the objects of such enforcement allows cosmopolitan norms their legitimacy 
amongst the people upon which such norms are being enforced. Without legitimacy, the 
enforcement of cosmopolitan values and the protection of civilians will have to focus on the 
destruction of disagreement with what we may view as cosmopolitanism, but what they view as 
colonialism and imperialism. This escalates rather than alleviates violence, as we have seen in the 
protection wars of the new millennium. 
To remedy this, cosmopolitanism needs to turn from its focus on civil society and take 
representative institutions seriously. It is undoubtedly true that cosmopolitan ethics and motives for 
cosmopolitan politics arise from the emerging global solidarity among global citizens. It is 
undoubtedly a product of the emergence of a global civil society, rather than state-centric 
development. Yet, just as functionalist integration could not ignore the need for authoritative 
decisions made by representative institutions, the enforcement of cosmopolitan peace will require 
authoritative decisions that can only be made by representative institutions. Successful enforcement 
of a set of principles will necessarily require authoritative decisions on the principles, on the way in 
which they are enforced, and by whom. Thus, we cannot simply rely on the type of improvised 
governance that the popular revolt against communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe represented. 
A change from functionalist integration studies to neo-functional integration studies was needed 
there. We will need a change from cosmopolitan to neo-cosmopolitan theory. This would take the 
question of agency seriously, recognizing that building a global order requires representation and 
new types of representative institutions. The problem with representation is especially urgent in the 
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third world, where most cosmopolitan humanitarian interventions have taken place and where 
popular representation is less developed. Until third world people can participate in the 
cosmopolitan process, the cosmopolitan West will be found to be fighting imperial wars rather than 
making humanitarian interventions. It may even be that until national representative institutions in 
the third world, institutions enabling participation in global dialogue are consolidated, we cannot 
expect these peoples’ participation and active engagement in the dialogue for creation of a truly 
globally-owned cosmopolitan consensus.  
Part of the problem of cosmopolitan protection of civilians may be related to the theoretical blind 
spots of cosmopolitan thinking. However, most of the problems must be attributed to the practice of 
political cosmopolitanism or the selfish nationalism of the powers that pretend to enforce a 
cosmopolitan order. The practice of political cosmopolitanism must stop ignoring existing 
international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, arms control 
regimes and so on. Assuming that powerful states have the right to enforce norms that they do not 
apply to themselves is a non-sequitur. Enforcing rules on war crimes without taking part in the 
international normative order that can condemn one’s own soldiers for these, enforcing arms control 
norms with which one is not ready to comply and making decisions to refer state leaders to 
international courts that one’s own country does not submit to, is a hypocrisy that no amount of 
cyber control or information warfare can hide.  
